Florida v. HHS - Amicus Brief of Independence Institute et al. by Indepedence Institute
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Litigation Research Projects and Empirical Data
1-1-2011
Florida v. HHS - Amicus Brief of Independence
Institute et al.
Indepedence Institute
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca
Part of the Health Law Commons
This Amicus Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Projects and Empirical Data at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Automated Citation
Indepedence Institute, "Florida v. HHS - Amicus Brief of Independence Institute et al." (2011). Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act Litigation. Paper 144.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca/144
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
No. 11-11021-HH 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants / Cross-
Appellee, v. 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, 
Defendants-Appellee / Cross-Appellant. 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Florida 
 
BRIEF OF AUTHORS OF THE ORIGINS OF THE 
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE (GARY LAWSON, 
ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY SEIDMAN) AND THE 
INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE AS AMICI CURIAE IN 
SUPPORT OF APPELLEES, URGING AFFIRMANCE 
 
David B. Kopel 
 Counsel of record 
INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE 
13952 Denver West Pkwy., Suite 400  
Golden, CO 80401 
(303) 279-6536 
Counsel for Amici Curiae 
 ii 
 
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES AND CORPORATE 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 26.1, the undersigned counsel certifies that the 
professor amici are individual persons, not corporations, and that the 
Independence Institute is a non-profit corporation, incorporated in 
Colorado. The Institute has no parent corporation, issues no stock, and 
there is no publicly held corporation that has an ownership interest of 
more than 10% in it.  
Undersigned counsel further certifies that to the best of his 
knowledge, the list of persons and entities in the Briefs for Appellants 
and Appellees which may have an interest in the outcome of this case is 
complete, except that to these should be added: 
Independence Institute 
Gary Lawson 
Robert G. Natelson 
Guy Seidman 
David B. Kopel     
            ____________________ 
            David B. Kopel 
 iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES AND CORPORATE 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ................................................................... ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................... iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................... vi 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ............................................................... x 
STATEMENT OF AMICI INTERESTS ................................................... xi 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................. xii 
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 1 
I. The Necessary and Proper Clause is a standard recital informing 
the reader that the legal doctrine of Incidental Powers applies to the 
Constitution’s enumerated grants of authority ..................................... 1 
A. Under founding-era law and practice, when an instrument 
granted enumerated powers and then followed the enumeration with 
a clause authorizing “necessary” actions in furtherance thereof, the 
clause was a mere recital that the doctrine of incidental powers 
applied to the instrument. ................................................................... 1 
 iv 
 
B. The drafting history of the Clause also demonstrates its role as 
a recital of the incidental powers doctrine .......................................... 4 
C. The ratification history of the Clause further demonstrates its 
role as a recital of the incidental powers doctrine. .............................. 6 
II.  To qualify as “Incidental,” a power had to be a subordinate power 
of the kind intended to accompany an express Power........................... 9 
A. To qualify as “incidental,” a power outside the strictest meaning 
of the words of the grant had to be of the kind intended by the 
makers of a document to accompany the stated powers. ..................... 9 
B. To qualify as incidental to an express power, an unstated power 
had to be less valuable than, or subordinate to, it. ........................... 11 
C. To qualify as “incidental” to an express power, a subsidiary 
power also had to be so connected to its principal by custom or 
necessity as to justify inferring that the parties intended the 
subsidiary to accompany the express power. ..................................... 12 
III.  The individual mandate is not a “Necessary” law for executing 
the Commerce Power because it is not incidental to the regulation of 
commerce. ............................................................................................. 14 
 v 
 
IV.  The Necessary and Proper Clause also serves as a recital 
informing the reader that laws are subject to fiduciary constraints. . 19 
V.  The individual mandate is not a “Proper” law for executing the 
Commerce Power. ................................................................................. 27 
Conclusion ............................................................................................ 30 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ........................................................ 31 
 
 vi 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Constitutional Provisions 
*art. I, § 8……………………………………………………………..…...passim  
art. II, § 1 ................................................................................................. 24 
art. II, §  3 .................................................................................................. 2 
art. III, § 1 ............................................................................................... 24 
art. V .......................................................................................................... 2 
ARTS. OF CONFED., art. II ......................................................................... 10 
U.S. Supreme Court Cases 
Ashcroft v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005) .............................. 15 
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (2001) ........................ 12 
*M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) .................................. passim 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995) ............ 15-16 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82 (1942) ............................ 15 
English Cases 
Anonymous (K.B. 1701) 12 Mod. 514, 88 Eng. Rep. 1487 ..........................13 
Boroughe’s Case (K.B. 1596) 4 Co. Rep. 72b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1043 ............ 3-4 
Case of Monopolies (Q.B. 1602) 11 Co. 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 ................29 
 vii 
 
Estwick v. City of London (K.B. 1647) Style 42, 82 Eng. Rep. 515 .... 22-23 
Keighley’s Case (C.P. 1709) 10 Co. Rep. 139a, 77 Eng. Rep. 113622, 26, 28 
Leader v. Moxon (C.P. 1781) 2 Bl. W. 924, 96 Eng. Rep 546 .. 23, 24, 26, 28 
Rooke’s Case (C.P. 1598) 5 Co. Rep. 99b, 77 Eng. Rep. 209 .......... 21, 22, 26 
The King v. Richardson (K.B. 1757) 2 Keny. 85, 96 Eng. Rep. 1115 .......12 
Books 
BACON, MATTHEW A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW (5th ed. Dublin, John 
Exshaw 1786) .................................................................................. 11-13 
BLACKSTONE, WILLIAM, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-
69) ............................................................................................. 10, 12, 13 
DE SMITH, STANLEY, ET AL, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
(5th ed. 1995) ......................................................................................... 23 
JACOB, GILES, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1782) ...................... 11-12 
JOHNSON, SAMUEL, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (multiple 
editions) ........................................................................................... 17-18 
*LAWSON, GARY, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON, & GUY I. 
SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE (2010)
 ...................................................................................................... passim 
 viii 
 
*MARSHALL, JOHN, JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. 
MARYLAND (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) ............................................ 8, 18 
SHERIDAN, THOMAS, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(1789) .............................................................................................. 17, 18 
SUPPLEMENT TO THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
(James H. Hutson ed., 1987) ...................................................... 4, 19, 29 
THE DEBATE IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) ............. 7 
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976) ...................................................... 7, 30 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (Max Farrrand ed., 1937) ... 5 
VINER, CHARLES, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY (1742) .. 12 
WADE, WILLIAM & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (10th ed. 
2009) ..................................................................................................... 22 
Law Review Articles 
Barnett, Randy E., New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847 (2003) .................................... 15 
 ix 
 
Barnett, Randy E., The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 
U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001) .................................................................... 15 
Lawson, Gary & Patricia Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: 
A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 
267 (1993) ............................................................................................. 20 
Lawson, Gary, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of 
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 (2005) ......... 19 
Natelson, Robert G., Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The 
General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239 (2007) ......................................................... 6, 10 
Natelson, Robert G., The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1077 (2004) ................................................................................... 27 
Natelson, Robert G., The Legal Meaning of “Commerce” In the 
Commerce Clause, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 789, 836-39 (2006) .............. 15 
 
Other Sources 
23 Hen. 8, c. V (1531) .............................................................................. 21 
Brief for Appellants ................................................................................. 27 
 x 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 
 Does the Necessary and Proper Clause provide an independent and 
sufficient grant of power that can authorize the imposition of the 
individual mandate? 
 xi 
 
 STATEMENT OF AMICI INTERESTS 
 
 Amici are experienced constitutional scholars and recognized 
authorities on the Necessary and Proper Clause. They are coauthors of 
the only book devoted entirely to the subject—The Origins of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, published by Cambridge University Press 
in 2010. Some of their other scholarship on the Clause is cited in the 
brief.  
 Gary Lawson is Professor of Law at Boston University. Robert G. 
Natelson is retired from his position as Professor of Law at the 
University of Montana, and is Senior Fellow in Constitutional Studies 
at the Independence Institute. Guy I. Seidman is Professor of Law at 
the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel.  
 The Independence Institute is a public policy research organization 
created in 1984, and founded on the eternal truths of the Declaration of 
Independence. The Independence Institute has participated as an 
amicus or party in many constitutional cases in federal and state 
courts. 
 xii 
 
Counsel for the parties have consented to the filing of this brief.1 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
 The Necessary and Proper Clause was one of a large family of similar 
clauses commonly appearing in eighteenth-century legal instruments 
delegating authority from one party to another. Those clauses followed 
several possible formulae. The Necessary and Proper Clause is a 
specimen of the most restrictive of those formulae: It does not actually 
grant additional authority beyond that conveyed by other enumerated 
powers. Rather, it is a recital, designed to inform the reader of two legal 
default rules:  
 First, that express grants of enumerated powers, stated elsewhere, 
carry with them subsidiary incidental powers (“necessary”).  
 Second, that congressional enactments must comply with standards 
of fiduciary obligation and administrative reasonableness (“proper”). 
                                                 
1
 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5), amici affirm that no counsel for a 
party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person other 
than amici and their counsel made a monetary contribution to its 
preparation or submission. The parties have consented to the filing of 
this brief. 
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 This understanding of the Clause appears in the legal practices and 
leading cases at the time the Constitution was adopted, and also in the 
history of the Clause itself—the records of its drafting, in the 
ratification debates, in the Supreme Court’s great case on the subject, 
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), and in Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s public explanations of M’Culloch. 
 Once the meaning of the Clause is understood, the implications for 
the individual mandate are clear:  
The mandate is not “necessary” because power to impose it is not a 
subsidiary “incident” to Congress’s Commerce Power. The power to 
compel the purchase of a product is as great or greater than the power 
to regulate voluntary commerce; therefore the mandate cannot be an 
incidental power regardless of how helpful it might be. For Congress to 
possess authority of that kind, it would have to be separately 
enumerated in the Constitution. 
 The mandate is not “proper” because it violates the fiduciary 
obligations of impartiality embedded in the word “proper.” During the 
debates over ratification, participants recognized that a law chartering 
 xiv 
 
a commercial monopoly would be “improper.” A fortiori, compelled 
purchase from favored oligopolists is improper. 
 Thus, to the extent that the constitutionality of the individual 
mandate depends upon the Necessary and Proper Clause, the mandate 
is unconstitutional.  
 
 1 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Necessary and Proper Clause is a standard 
recital informing the reader that the legal doctrine of 
Incidental Powers applies to the Constitution’s 
enumerated grants of authority 
 
A. Under founding-era law and practice, when an instrument granted 
enumerated powers and then followed the enumeration with a clause 
authorizing “necessary” actions in furtherance thereof, the clause was a 
mere recital that the doctrine of incidental powers applied to the 
instrument. 
  
During the founding era, both the general public and governmental 
units made wide use of powers of attorney, trust instruments, corporate 
charters, commissions, and other fiduciary documents by which one or 
more persons or entities granted power to other persons or entities. 
GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON, & GUY I. 
SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 52-83, 
144-76 (2010) (hereinafter “ORIGINS”) (corporate charters and numerous 
other instruments). In preparing fiduciary documents, drafters followed 
certain conventions and customs. If the instrument listed express 
powers but did not by its terms limit the grantee only to the exercise of 
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those express powers (as did the Articles of Confederation),2 the 
drafters customarily included one or more general clauses informing the 
reader of any further authority conveyed to the grantee. 
 The scope of that further authority depended on the wording of the 
clause. Such clauses fell into at least five separate formulae. ORIGINS at 
72-78. The Necessary and Proper Clause is a specimen of the most 
restrictive formula from the point of view of powers granted. 
Specifically, it restrained the discretion of the power grantee (here, 
Congress) more than other formulae, and it required that congressional 
laws meet standards of propriety as well as necessity. ORIGINS at 77-78. 
(The requirement of propriety is discussed below.) Significantly, in 
other parts of the Constitution the Framers opted for clauses following 
wider formulae. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §3 (granting the President 
power to make such recommendations to Congress as “as he shall judge 
necessary and expedient”); U.S. CONST. art. V (granting Congress power 
                                                 
2 ARTS. OF CONFED. art. II (“Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, 
and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not 
by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in 
Congress assembled”) (emphasis added). 
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to propose amendments whenever it “shall deem it necessary”). But the 
Framers did not do so in the case of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
 In the eighteenth century, the term “necessary” often signified 
incidence. ORIGINS at 61 n.26 (citing many examples). When a legal 
instrument conveyed express powers, and then authorized actions 
“necessary” to effectuate those powers, the word “necessary” confirmed 
that the instrument was subject to the prevailing common law doctrine 
of incidental powers. The doctrine of incidental powers widened the 
strict meaning of words sufficiently to carry out the intent of the parties 
to the instrument. For example, express grant of authority to manage a 
farm “and take further actions necessary thereto” might add incidental 
authority to sell the farm’s crops to the manager’s core responsibility to 
oversee operations on the land. 
 Absent an express declaration to the contrary, the doctrine of 
incidental powers was the default rule. Even so, many founding-era 
drafters found it helpful to inform readers of the doctrine by recital. As 
Lord Coke had explained, such recitals “declare and express to laymen . 
. . what the law requires in such cases.” Boroughe’s Case (K.B. 1596) 4 
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Co. Rep. 72b, 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1043, 1044-45 (reporter’s commentary). 
The doctrine of incidental powers is discussed further below. 
B. The drafting history of the Clause also demonstrates its role as a 
recital of the incidental powers doctrine 
 
A majority of the delegates to the 1787 federal convention were or 
had been practicing lawyers. Many, if not most, of the non-lawyer 
delegates also were knowledgeable about law as a result of personal 
study, business and professional experience, and government service. 
ORIGINS at 85. 
 Most delegates wanted the new Constitution to grant incidental as 
well as express authority to the federal government. They believed that 
the failure of the Articles of Confederation to grant Congress such 
authority had been a mistake. Among those holding this view was John 
Dickinson of Delaware, who had, in addition to his public service, been 
a highly prominent practicing lawyer. Dickinson’s outline for a new 
Constitution contained a forerunner of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. SUPPLEMENT TO THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, 86, 89 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987). 
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 Actual drafting of the Necessary and Proper Clause was undertaken 
by the Committee of Detail. Like Dickinson, four of the five members of 
that Committee had prestigious legal backgrounds: Edmund Randolph, 
Oliver Ellsworth, John Rutledge, and James Wilson. ORIGINS at 85-86. 
The fifth member, Nathaniel Gorham, was a merchant and former 
president of Congress, and thus well acquainted with documents by 
which agents and other delegates were empowered. Id. at 85. 
 The first draft of the Clause, extant in Randolph’s handwriting, 
expressly referenced the incidental power doctrine as a tool of judicial 
interpretation. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 144 (Max 
Farrrand, ed., 1937) (“all incidents without which the general principles 
cannot be satisfied shall be considered, as involved in the general 
principle”). The provision was replaced by one in Rutledge’s 
handwriting, which substituted the most common legal label for 
incidental powers: “necessary.” The new provision read, “a right to 
make all Laws necessary to carry the foregoing Powers into Execu-.” Id. 
The Committee then added the words “and proper.” After some 
polishing, the final result was approved by the Committee and the 
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Convention without significant controversy. Randolph subsequently 
confirmed publicly that the word “necessary” was a synonym for 
“incidental.” ORIGINS at 88, n.28 (referencing U.S. Attorney General 
Randolph’s opinion on the constitutionality of a proposed national 
bank). 
C. The ratification history of the Clause further demonstrates its role as 
a recital of the incidental powers doctrine. 
 
 The Clause was much-discussed during the ratification debates. This 
was true in part because, for various reasons, the American public 
seems to have understood and appreciated fiduciary law to a 
considerable degree. Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special 
Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law 
of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239, 247-48 (2007) (discussing 
the fiduciary knowledge of the eighteenth-century general public and 
some reasons for it). That was why, for example, the floor leader of the 
Federalists at the North Carolina ratifying convention, James Iredell, 
could describe the Constitution as “a great power of attorney” and think 
such a characterization would be persuasive. 4 THE DEBATE IN THE 
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SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 148 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891).  
 The leading concerns of “Anti-Federalists” opposing the Constitution 
during those debates were that the Constitution granted, or could be 
construed to grant, excessive authority to the federal government. They 
cited the Necessary and Proper Clause as an example. However, in the 
course of their argument, Anti-Federalists persistently misquoted the 
Clause as if it followed another of the common formulae for such 
clauses—a formula granting wider power. E.g., 13 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 402 (Merrill Jensen, 
et al. eds. 1976) (anti-Federalist tract changing “necessary and proper” 
to “which the Congress shall think necessary and proper”). 
 To correct this inaccuracy, leading Federalists—including but not 
limited to James Madison and Alexander Hamilton—explained to the 
ratifying public that the Clause as actually worded granted no 
substantive authority. They pointed out that the Framers inserted the 
Clause not as a power grant but merely from an abundance of caution: 
It was designed to avoid quibbling disputes about the extent of federal 
 8 
 
authority and to clarify that the express grants in the Constitution 
(unlike those in the Articles of Confederation) should be read to include 
recognized, subsidiary means. ORIGINS at 97-108 (citing The Federalist 
and many other sources). The Federalists further emphasized that the 
legal effect would have been precisely the same if the Necessary and 
Proper Clause were not included, and that congressional authority was 
limited to the powers otherwise enumerated. Id. Several ratifying 
conventions recommended declaratory amendments to cement this 
understanding; these declarations were eventually adopted as the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Id. at 113-14 (listing substance of 
amendments proposed). 
 In the most important decision on the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), Chief Justice John Marshall 
applied the Clause as a recital of the incidental powers doctrine. In 
public writings explaining M’Culloch, Marshall explicitly endorsed that 
view of the Clause, JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. 
MARYLAND 166-176 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) (quoting Marshall’s 
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language), and emphasized that it granted no additional power. Id. at 
176. 
 In short, the legal background, drafting history, and ratification 
history all show that the Clause did not extend congressional authority 
beyond those otherwise granted. It merely affirmed the default rule that 
the express grants of power in the Constitution included the lesser, 
incidental powers necessary and proper to effectuate the express power. 
II.  To qualify as “Incidental,” a power had to be a 
subordinate power of the kind intended to accompany 
an express Power 
A. To qualify as “incidental,” a power outside the strictest meaning of the 
words of the grant had to be of the kind intended by the makers of a 
document to accompany the stated powers. 
 
 The incidental powers doctrine was an application of wider legal 
concepts governing principals and incidents. In the case of the 
incidental power doctrine, the express power was the principal and the 
implied power the incident or accessory. ORIGINS 60-67. 
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 The bedrock obligation of the eighteenth-century fiduciary3 was to 
act only within granted authority, as defined by the terms of the 
governing instrument. Although the instrument could limit authority 
granted only to that within its express terms, e.g., ARTS. OF CONFED., 
art. II, in the absence of such specification, the default assumption was 
that the express grants carried with them incidental or implied 
authority. As William Blackstone wrote, “[a] subject’s grant shall be 
construed to include many things, besides what are expressed, if 
necessary for the operation of the grant.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *347 (1765-69). 
 The essential purpose of this rule was to assist the interpreter in 
arriving at results consistent with the probable intent of the parties. 
ORIGINS at 60-67, 82-83 (citing, among other sources, Chief Justice 
Marshall). 
                                                 
3 Because the Necessary and Proper Clause was drafted and ratified in 
the late eighteenth century, we discuss here only those principles 
applied during the founding era. In general, however, the underlying 
principles of founding-era fiduciary law were similar to those of 
fiduciary law today. See generally Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review 
of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the 
Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239 (2007) 
(describing eighteenth-century fiduciary principles). 
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B. To qualify as incidental to an express power, an unstated power had 
to be less valuable than, or subordinate to, it. 
 
An incident was “a thing necessarily depending upon, appertaining 
to, or following another thing that is more worthy or principal.” GILES 
JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1782) (unpaginated). To qualify 
as an incident, 
an interest had to be less important or less valuable than its 
principal. The term “merely” was often applied to incidents, 
as was the word “only.” An incident was always 
subordinated to or dependent on the principal. The courts 
sometimes phrased the latter requirement by stating that an 
incident could not comprise a subject matter independent of 
its principal nor could it change the nature of the grant. 
 
ORIGINS at 61-62. 
 For example, authority to manage lands might carry incidental 
authority to make short-term leases but not to sell a portion of the fee. 
The power to sell was independent of, or as “worthy” as, the power to 
manage. 1 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 235-36 
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(5th ed. Dublin, John Exshaw 1786), 3 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL 
ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 538-40 (1742).4 
C. To qualify as “incidental” to an express power, a subsidiary power 
also had to be so connected to its principal by custom or necessity as to 
justify inferring that the parties intended the subsidiary to accompany 
the express power. 
 
 Being dependent upon or inferior to a principal was a precondition to 
qualifying as an incident, but was not sufficient. As is illustrated by the 
above-quoted passages from Blackstone’s Commentaries and Giles 
Jacobs’ widely-used A New Law Dictionary, an additional requirement 
was necessity. The term “necessity,” in this context, was well understood 
as a term of art. It referred to either of two situations. First, a power 
could be “necessary” by reason of factual necessity. Thus, it was 
potentially incidental if either indispensable to the use of the principal 
(e.g., The King v. Richardson (K.B. 1757) 2 Keny. 85, 119, 96 Eng. Rep. 
1115, 1127) or so valuable to the principal that without it the principal 
                                                 
4 Bacon’s Abridgment was a digest, first published early in the 
eighteenth-century and periodically republished. It was highly popular 
during the founding era and has been cited in 55 Supreme Court cases, 
most recently in Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 
2125 (2001). Viner’s Abridgment (written by the man who arranged for 
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would have little value. Strong necessity falling short of 
indispensability sometimes was described by saying that absence of 
connection between two powers would lead to “great prejudice.” 3 
MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW *406 (1786). For 
example, fish (personal property) are not absolutely necessary to the 
existence of the pond containing them (real property), but “they are so 
annexed to and so necessary to the well-being of the [real-property] 
inheritance, that they shall accompany the land wherever it vests . . . .” 
2 BLACKSTONE, at *427-28. 
 In addition to factual necessity, pre-existing custom could serve as a 
form of fictional “necessity”—and therefore of incidence. For example, a 
factor (broker) enjoyed subsidiary power to extend credit if a broker of 
that kind customarily received that power. See Anonymous (K.B. 1701) 
12 Mod. 514, 88 Eng. Rep. 1487. 
 Both customary and factual “necessity” made good sense, since they 
pointed toward the probable or constructive intent of the parties to the 
grant.  
                                                                                                                                                             
William Blackstone’s academic appointment) was the largest digest of 
the time. 
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III.  The individual mandate is not a “Necessary” law 
for executing the Commerce Power because it is not 
incidental to the regulation of commerce. 
 
 The Founding-Era history of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
demonstrates that to be truly incidental the regulation must be of the 
kind authorized by an intent-based construction of the instrument even 
in the absence of the Necessary and Proper Clause. This, in turn, 
requires as a threshold matter that the power be subsidiary to (less 
“worthy” than) the enumerated power. If that requirement is met, then 
the power is incidental only if it accompanies the principal power by 
virtue of custom or is necessary in fact. Supra at Part II. 
 It is clear that the individual mandate is neither a customary 
concomitant to the federal regulation of commerce (it is unprecedented) 
nor necessary in fact (as long-standing state health care regulations 
demonstrate). But there is no need to examine those questions because 
the individual mandate does not even meet the threshold test of 
subsidiarity. 
 The authority claimed by the government in this case—to compel 
private citizens to purchase approved products from other, designated 
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private persons—can be subsidiary to nothing. It is a power awesome in 
scope. Because such a power is more, not less, substantial than the 
power to regulate commerce, it cannot be incidental to the Commerce 
Clause.5 
 Consider an analogy: If one were to grant a power of attorney to a 
person to manage an apartment building, it could not be safely assumed 
(in absence of specific language) that the building manager also 
                                                 
5 The Supreme Court’s modern cases upholding extensive regulation 
over economic matters generally rely, implicitly or explicitly, on the 
“necessary and proper” component of the commerce power rather than 
on the core express power to “regulate Commerce.” See, e.g., Ashcroft v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 
111, 125, 63 S.Ct. 82, 89 (1942). In fact, the Court has not greatly 
altered the fairly narrow definition of the core power that prevailed at 
the Founding. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001); Randy E. Barnett, New 
Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. 
REV. 847 (2003); Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Meaning of “Commerce” 
In the Commerce Clause, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 789, 836-39 (2006) (all 
finding that “to regulate commerce” meant only to govern mercantile 
trade and certain closely-related activities). Therefore, a law claimed to 
be “incidental” to the regulation of commerce must be compared for 
“worthiness” with the scope of the core express power, not with 
“necessary and proper” economic regulation generally. To do otherwise 
would be to pile incidence upon incidence. 
 For this reason, the Court has developed tests to determine whether 
a law outside the core power is truly incidental to regulating commerce. 
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995) 
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received authority to sell the building. Because the power to sell a fee is 
not “less worthy” or less substantial than the power to manage, it 
cannot be incidental thereto. Thus, if a property owner also wishes to 
convey authority to sell, the authorizing instrument should so specify. 
 Similarly, if the Founders wished to grant Congress sweeping 
authority to compel all private citizens to do business with any other 
private persons, the Founders surely would have referred to it in the 
document. 
 M’Culloch confirms this analysis—that is, the need to determine, 
before addressing other aspects of necessity, whether authority claimed 
as incidental really is of an inferior or subsidiary character. In 
M’Culloch, the Court held that incorporation of a bank was a “necessary 
and proper” means for executing the principal powers to tax, borrow, 
regulate commerce, and maintain a military. However, the Court was 
careful to explain that incorporation was “not, like the power of making 
war, or levying taxes, or of regulating commerce, a great substantive 
and independent power, which cannot be implied as incidental to other 
                                                                                                                                                             
(requiring that the law address economic activity that substantially 
affects commerce). 
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powers.” 17 U.S. at 417. Instead, incorporation “must be considered as a 
means not less usual, not of higher dignity, not more requiring a 
particular specification than other means . . . .”Id. at 421. Of course, it 
was not sufficient to uphold the constitutionality of the Bank that the 
power to incorporate was of this lesser dignity. Incorporation also had to 
be “necessary and proper” for executing federal power. However, its 
lesser character was, as Chief Justice Marshall recognized, a threshold 
requirement before inquiry could proceed on the questions of necessity 
and propriety. If the power to incorporate was as substantial as the 
principal powers, it would not matter how helpful or customary the 
bank might be.6 
                                                 
6 M’Culloch is sometimes misunderstood as authorizing more than it 
authorized because it stated that subsidiary means may be upheld 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause if they are “convenient,” 17 U.S. 
at 413, or “appropriate,” id. at 421, for executing express powers. 
However, both adjectives had distinctly narrower meanings when 
Marshall wrote than they do today. “Convenient” meant only “Fit; 
suitable; proper; well-adapted,” SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (multiple editions, upaginated); see also, THOMAS 
SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1789) 
(unpaginated) (defining “convenient” as “Fit, suitable, proper”), and as 
Chief Justice Marshall himself noted, MARSHALL, DEFENSE, supra, at 
106, “appropriate” signified “peculiar,” “consigned to some particular 
use or person,”—“belonging peculiarly.” See also JOHNSON, supra 
(defining “peculiar” as “appropriate; belonging to anyone with exclusion 
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 If there were any doubt on this point, Marshall himself resolved it 
later the same year, when explaining M’Culloch to the general public. 
He specifically accepted, as a test of incidence, the requirement that an 
incident be less “worthy” than the enumerated powers it supported. 
JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND at 171. 
 It is true that in rare cases, the Constitution authorizes, as incidents 
of enumerated powers, citizen participation requirements: jury service, 
military conscription, and eminent domain on payment of just 
compensation. However, those all are cases—like the power to tax—in 
which the citizen is required to enter a relationship with his or her 
government. All were, moreover, sovereign prerogatives recognized as 
such during the founding era. An unprecedented mandate requiring 
citizens to purchase a product from favored suppliers is quite another 
matter. 
 The individual mandate simply cannot quality as an incident of 
Congress’s power to “regulate Commerce.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
of others” and “Not common to other things” and “Particular, single”); 
cf. SHERIDAN,  (defining “appropriate” as “peculiar, consigned to some 
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IV.  The Necessary and Proper Clause also serves as a 
recital informing the reader that laws are subject to 
fiduciary constraints. 
 
 In addition to being “necessary,” congressional enactments under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause must be “proper.” That propriety was a 
separate requirement from necessity is confirmed by the decision of the 
Committee of Detail to add “proper” separately and at a later time than 
it inserted “necessary,” 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, at 144, and by a wealth of other textual, structural, and historical 
evidence. Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” 
Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
235, 249-55 (2005). 
 A law is “proper” within the meaning of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause only if the law conforms with the fiduciary norms of public 
trust—that is, with such duties as impartiality, good faith, and due 
care, and the duty to remain within the scope of granted authority. 
There are several reasons for believing this to be so. 
                                                                                                                                                             
particular”). 
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 First, during the founding era, in the context of governmental power, 
the word “proper” often was used to describe actions peculiarly within 
the jurisdiction of the actor. Gary Lawson & Patricia Granger, The 
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the 
Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). Moreover, during the federal 
convention, “proper” and “propriety” very frequently denoted 
compliance with fiduciary obligations of various kinds, while breaches 
of such obligations were described as “improper.” ORIGINS at 89-91 
(citing numerous examples). Ratification-era discussion included 
similar characteristics, with suggestions that laws violating the 
fiduciary obligations of Congress would be “improper,” and therefore 
unconstitutional. Id. at 108-09. 
 Furthermore, the Constitution was seen as a kind of corporate 
charter—not surprisingly so, since founding-era corporate charters were 
often public or quasi-public instruments. ORIGINS at 147. Corporate 
charters very frequently contained language similar to that of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. Although such provisions varied in their 
precise language, a scholarly survey of charters has confirmed that the 
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word “proper,” particularly when coupled with “necessary,” described 
compliance with fiduciary obligations. Id. at 173-74 (survey of 374 
contemporaneous charters). 
 Finally, the status of the Clause as a recital strongly suggests that 
“proper” included the then-prevalent public law rule that grants of 
delegated discretionary authority had to be exercised reasonably, even 
when that requirement was not spelled out in the grant. This 
requirement of reasonableness overlapped with, and may have been 
identical to, fiduciary obligations. 
 The requirement of reasonableness in the exercise of delegated public 
power is typically traced to the 1598 decision in Rooke’s Case (C.P. 
1598) 5 Co. Rep. 99b, 77 Eng. Rep. 209.7 In that case, a statute (23 Hen. 
8, c. V, § 3, cl. 3 (1531)) had given sewer commissioners the power to 
assess landowners for the costs of repairing water-control projects as 
the commissioners “shall deem most convenient to be ordained.” The 
commissioner used this statute to assess the full costs of a repair on a 
                                                 
7 On Rooke’s Case as the foundational authority for the interpretation 
of delegated powers, see WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 293-94 (10th ed. 2009). 
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single landowner, even though other landowners were also benefited by 
the project. The court ruled for the assessed landowner because,  
notwithstanding the Words of the commission give Authority 
to the commissioners to do according to their Discretions, yet 
their Proceedings ought to be limited and bound with the 
Rule of Reason and law. For Discretion is a Science or 
Understanding to discern between Falsity and Truth, 
between Wrong and Right, between Shadows and Substance, 
between Equity and colourable Glosses and Pretences, and 
not to do according to their Wills and private Affections . . . . 
 
5 Co. Rep. at 100b, 77 Eng. Rep. 210.  
In other words, discretion, even when textually unlimited, had to be 
exercised reasonably and in a disinterested and impartial fashion. 
 Other decisions applied a similar principle regarding exercise of even 
very broadly worded grants of discretion. See Keighley’s Case (C.P. 
1709) 10 Co. Rep. 139a, 140a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1136, 1138 (statute 
authorizing sewer commissioner to make rules “after your own wisdoms 
and discretions” required the agent to exercise discretion “according to 
law and justice”). Still other cases extended the principle beyond sewer 
commissions to include all delegated power. See Estwick v. City of 
London (K.B. 1647) Style 42, 43, 82 Eng. Rep. 515, 516 (“wheresoever a 
commissioner or other person had power given to do a thing at his 
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discretion, it is to be understood of sound discretion, and according to 
law” (emphasis added)). This constraint on the exercise of delegated 
power, which in England has come to be called the principle of 
reasonableness, was firmly established by the end of the seventeenth 
century. STANLEY DE SMITH ET AL, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION 297-98 (5th ed. 1995). 
 The principle of reasonableness in the exercise of delegated power 
was reiterated in 1773 in Leader v. Moxon (C.P. 1781) 2 Bl. W. 924, 96 
Eng. Rep 546. Paving commissioners, under a statute giving them 
power to pave or repair streets “in such a manner as the commissioners 
shall think fit,” ordered a road repair that effectively buried the doors 
and windows of plaintiff’s house. In awarding damages to the 
homeowner, the court wrote that the agents “had grossly exceeded their 
Powers, which must have a reasonable construction. Their Discretion is 
not arbitrary, but must be limited by Reason and Law . . . . [H]ad 
Parliament intended to demolish or render useless some houses for the 
Benefit or Ornament of the rest, it would have given express Powers for 
the Purpose, and given an Equivalent for the loss that Individuals 
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might have sustained thereby.” Id. at 2 Bl. W. at 925-26, 96 Eng. Rep. 
at 546-47.  
 These constraints on government discretion were simply part of what 
it meant to exercise delegated public power in the founding era. 
Accordingly, when the federal Constitution vested “executive Power” in 
the President, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, and “judicial Power” in the 
federal courts, id. art. III, § 1, those grants of power carried with them 
the principle of reasonableness as a limitation. 
 Because the principle of reasonableness in England was an 
assumption about Parliament’s intentions in granting power to 
executive and judicial agents, the reasonableness principle did not 
apply to Parliament itself. One could account for that result in either of 
two ways: (1) because Parliament did not exercise delegated power or 
(2) because Parliament exercised legislative power and the principle of 
reasonableness applied only to executive and judicial power. If the 
reason for not applying the principle to Parliament was that Parliament 
did not exercise delegated power, then the principle of reasonableness 
would apply of its own force to Congress, because Congress under the 
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Constitution, unlike Parliament, does in fact exercise only delegated 
power. But if the reason for non-application was that the principle did 
not reach legislative power as such, then the principle might only apply 
to Congress if there were some specific textual indication that it did so. 
 The Necessary and Proper Clause is a textual vehicle for making 
clear that the principle of reasonableness applies to Congress’s 
implementational powers, just as the principle applies of its own force 
to the President and the federal courts. It was not open to a drafter in 
the late eighteenth century simply to say that “the principle of 
reasonableness shall apply to Congress,” because the label, “the 
principle of reasonableness,” did not then exist; it is a relatively recent 
piece of nomenclature. ORIGINS at 121. Nor was the doctrine sufficiently 
well formulated at the time of the framing to be described by any other 
readily identifiable label. The contours of the doctrine, however, were 
very well described by the phrase “necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution . . . .” 
 The case law through the eighteenth century applying what later 
came to be called the principle of reasonableness established that 
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discretion in governmental actors must be exercised impartially 
(Rooke’s Case; Keighley’s Case), with attention to causal efficacy 
(Keighley’s Case), in a measured and proportionate fashion (Leader v. 
Moxon), and with regard for the rights of affected subjects (Leader v. 
Moxon). See ORIGINS at 120, 137-41 (elaborating the substantive 
requirements of reasonableness contained in the leading cases). Those 
requirements for governmental action are well encapsulated by a 
provision stating that laws for executing powers must be “necessary and 
proper.” A clause empowering one to act in a “necessary and proper” 
manner affirmed that the actor had incidental powers, but only to the 
extent exercised in conformance with the full panoply of fiduciary 
duties. ORIGINS at 80.  
 In assessing such evidence, it must be understood that the 
generation that wrote and adopted the Constitution viewed government 
as properly constrained by obligations of fiduciary trust. Indeed, writers 
and speakers sometimes seem obsessed with the idea. Political 
discourse was filled with assessments of government rules and actions 
according to fiduciary standards. ORIGINS at 52-56; Robert G. Natelson, 
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The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077 (2004). 
This kind of discussion was prominent at both the federal and state 
ratifying conventions. Id. at 1083-86 (citing numerous examples). 
V.  The individual mandate is not a “Proper” law for 
executing the Commerce Power. 
 
 As pointed out above, the founders sought to incorporate fiduciary 
standards into the Constitution. One way in which they did so was to 
require that federal laws be “proper.” This requires, at the least, 
compliance with basic fiduciary norms, including fiduciary obligations 
and the overlapping, if not identical, requirements of “reasonableness.”8 
 One of the most basic fiduciary norms is the obligation to treat all 
principals with presumptive equality when there is more than one 
principal. In Keighley’s Case, supra, for instance, the sewer 
commissioners could not impose the full costs of projects or repairs on 
                                                 
8 The government—with no historical or conceptual warrant or 
argument—asserts that the individual mandate is “proper” because it 
“take[s] into account the societal judgment—reflected in state and 
federal law—that denying emergency care because the patient lacks 
insurance would be unconscionable.” Brief for Appellants, at 36. 
However, as pointed out in this section, the word “proper” in the 
Necessary and Proper Clause does not depend on societal judgments 
regarding sound policy. 
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only some of the affected landowners, even when the governing statutes 
seemed to provide that discretion. Nor under Leader v. Moxon could the 
paving commissioners repair a road by burying one person’s house. 
 The purpose of the individual mandate is to force people who choose 
not to buy insurance to enter the market in order to subsidize other 
people. Although Congress could fund an insurance subsidy program for 
high-risk individuals through general taxation, the individual mandate 
is not a tax but essentially a form of involuntary servitude. It is 
analogous to, for example, compelling physicians, under penalty of fine, 
to devote fifteen hours per week to providing health care to favored 
individuals. It also is analogous to relieving distress in the automobile 
industry by compelling citizens to buy cars. Similarly, Congress cannot 
use the Necessary and Proper Clause to force one class of citizens to buy 
a product to help others (even if Congress can provide that help directly 
through other constitutional powers). 
 Although the individual mandate is unprecedented, the Founders 
were familiar with a related, although less intrusive, commercial 
regulation: the government-chartered monopoly. When the government 
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chartered a monopoly, it limited the market to one provider—although 
unlike the individual mandate, citizens remained free to choose not to 
purchase goods or services from the monopolist. Grants of monopolies 
were unpopular, since by erecting a system of commercial favoritism 
they violated the government’s fiduciary obligation to treat citizens 
impartially, and were held to violate common law. Case of Monopolies 
(Q.B. 1602) 11 Co. 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260. 
 Leading Founders were split on whether the congressional power to 
regulate commerce included authority to establish monopolies. Compare 
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 616 (quoting 
James Wilson as stating that such authority was included), and at 633 
(quoting Elbridge Gerry to like effect) with 616 (quoting George Mason 
to the contrary). Yet during the ratification debates, the Constitution’s 
advocates asserted that any law creating a monopoly would be invalid 
as “improper” under the Necessary and Proper Clause. As a Federalist 
writer calling himself the “Impartial Citizen” pointed out: 
In this case, the laws which Congress can make . . . must not 
only be necessary, but proper—So that if those powers cannot 
be executed without the aid of a law, granting commercial 
monopolies. . . such a law would be manifestly not proper, it 
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would not be warranted by this clause, without absolutely 
departing from the usual acceptation of words. 
 
8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY at 431. 
The conclusion is clear: If a commercial monopoly—which citizens 
may avoid by not purchasing the product monopolized—is 
constitutionally void as “improper,” then far more “improper” is a 
mandate for the benefit of a favored few and that none but a favored 
few may avoid. 
Conclusion 
 
 The decision of the District Court should be affirmed. 
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